229
Fr. It would seem, then, Socrates, either that you do not regard me as your friend, or if you do, that you do not obey Hipparchus. For that you are not deceiving me—though I cannot tell how you contrive it—in your talk, is more than I can believe.
229
Soc. Well now, as though we were playing draughts, I am willing to let you revoke, as you please, anything you have said in carrying on the discussion, in order that you may not think you are being deceived. So tell me, shall I revoke for you the statement that all men desire good things?
229
Fr. No, thank you.
229
Soc. Well, that suffering loss, or loss, is an evil?
229
Fr. No, thank you.
229
Soc. Well, that gain, or making gain, is the opposite of loss, or suffering loss?
230
Fr. Nor that either.
230
Soc. Well, that making gain, as the opposite of evil, is a good?
230
Fr. Nothing of all this do I bid you revoke for me.
230
Soc. You think, then, it seems, that some gain is good, and some evil.
230
Fr. I do.
230
Soc. Well then, I revoke so much for you; so let us assume that some gain is good, and some other gain evil. But the good sort is no more gain than the evil sort, is it?
230
Fr. What do you mean by this question?
230
Soc. I will explain. Is there both good and evil food?
230
Fr. Yes.
230
Soc. And is the one sort more food than the other, or are they both similarly this same thing, food, and in this respect does the one differ no wise from the other, in being food, but only in the fact of the one being good and the other evil?
230
Fr. Yes.
230
Soc. And so with drink and every other class of things that exist, when some things in any class come to be good, and others evil, one thing does not differ from another in that respect whereby they are the same? For instance, one man, I suppose, is virtuous, and another wicked.
230
Fr. Yes.
230
Soc. But neither of them, I conceive, is more or less man than the other—neither the virtuous than the wicked, nor the wicked than the virtuous.
230
Fr. What you say is true.
