137
No, only this. And that whereby they punish rightly is that whereby they know the good and bad people?
137
It is.
137
And whoever knows one will know many also?
137
Yes.
137
And whoever does not know many will not know one?
137
I agree.
137
Then if one were a horse, and did not know the good and wicked horses, would one not know which sort one was oneself?
137
I think not.
137
And if one were an ox and did not know the wicked and good oxen, would one not know which sort one was oneself?
137
That is so, he said.
137
And so it would be, if one were a dog?
137
He agreed.
138
Well now, when one is a man, and does not know the good and bad men, one surely cannot know whether one is good or wicked oneself, since one is a man also oneself?
138
He granted this.
138
And is not knowing oneself being temperate, Cf. Charmides (Introduction and 164) for the connection in thought and language between temperance and self-knowledge. or not being temperate?
138
Not being temperate.
138
So knowing oneself is being temperate?
138
I agree, he said.
138
So this is the message, it seems, of the Delphic inscription—that one is to practise temperance and justice.
138
It seems so.
138
And it is by this same art that we know also how to punish rightly?
138
Yes.
138
Then that whereby we know how to punish rightly is justice, and that whereby we know how to distinguish our own and others’ quality is temperance?
138
It seems so, he said.
138
Then justice and temperance are the same thing?
138
Apparently.
138
And further, it is thus, you know, that cities are well ordered—when the wrongdoers pay the penalty.
138
That is true, he said.
138
Hence this is also statecraft.
138
He concurred.
