133
Then I remarked: So philosophizing seems to you to be honorable?
133
Quite so, he said.
133
Well now, I said; does it seem to you possible to know whether anything is honorable or shameful without knowing what it is fundamentally?
133
No, he said. Then do you know, I went on, what philosophizing is?
133
Certainly I do, said he.
133
Then what is it? I asked.
133
Why, just what Solon called it; you know it was Solon who said:And ever, as I older grow, I learn yet more and more;Solon Fr. 18—and I agree with him that a man who intends to philosophize should in this way be ever learning something or other, whether he be younger or older, in order that he may learn as many things as possible in his life. Now at first I felt there was something in his reply, but then, on second thoughts, I asked him whether he considered philosophy to be much learning. To which he answered: Certainly.
133
And do you consider philosophy to be merely honorable, I asked, or good as well?
133
Good as well, he said: very much so.
133
Then do you observe this as peculiar to philosophy, or do you find it similarly in everything else? For example, do you consider the love of athletics to be not merely honorable, but good as well, or do you not?
133
Whereupon he, most slily, gave a double answer: To him my statement must be neither; but to you, Socrates, I acknowledge it to be both honorable and good: for I consider this the right view.
133
Then I asked him: Well now, in athletics, do you consider that much exercise is love of athletics?
133
To which he replied: Certainly, just as in philosophizing I consider much learning to be philosophy.
133
Then I said: And do you then consider that the lovers of athletics desire anything else than that which will cause them to be in good bodily condition?
133
Only that, he replied.
133
And does much exercise, I asked, cause them to be in good bodily condition?
134
Yes, for how, he replied, could one be in good bodily condition through little exercise?
