Book 6
487
Nay, most necessary, he said. Is there any fault, then, that you can find with a pursuit which a man could not properly practise unless he were by nature of good memory, quick apprehension, magnificent,μεγαλοπρεπής is frequently ironical in Plato, but not here. For the list of qualities of the ideal student cf. also 503 C, Theaet. 144 A-B, and Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 418. Cf. Laws 709 E on the qualifications of the young tyrant, and Cic. Tusc. v. 24, with Renaissance literature on education. gracious, friendly and akin to truth, justice, bravery and sobriety? MomusThe god of censure, who finds fault with the gods in Lucian’s dialogues. Cf. Overbeck, Schriftquellen, p. 208, n. 1091, Otto, p. 227, s. v. Momus. Cf. Callimachus, fr. 70; and Anth. Pal. xvi. 262. 3-4: αὐτὸς ὁ Μῶμος φθέγξεται, Ἄκρητος, Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἡ σοφίη, Momus himself will cry out Father Zeus, this was perfect skill. (L.C.L. translation.) Stallbaum refers to Erasmus, Chiliad, i. 5. 75 and interpreters on Aristaenet. Epist. i. I, p. 239, ed. Boissonade. himself, he said, could not find fault with such a combination. Well, then, said I, when men of this sort are perfected by education and maturity of age, would you not entrust the state solely to them? And Adeimantus said, No one, Socrates, would be able to controvert these statements of yours. But, all the same, those who occasionally hear youCf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 35 n. 236, and What Plato Said, p. 488 on Crito 48 B. A speaker in Plato may thus refer to any fundamental Platonic doctrine. Wilamowitz’ suggested emendation (Platon, ii. p. 205) ἃ ἂν λέγῃς is due to a misunderstanding of this. argue thus feel in this wayA locus classicus for Plato’s anticipation of objections. Cf. 475 B, Theaet. 166 A-B, Rep. 609 C, 438-439, and Apelt, Republic, p. 492. Plato does it more tactfully than Isocrates, e.g. Demon. 44.: They think that owing to their inexperience in the game of question and answerCf. Apelt, Aufsätze, p. 73, Minto, Logic, Induction and Deduction, pp. 4 ff.; also Gorg. 461 D, 462 A, Soph. 230 B. they are at every question led astrayCf. Phaedrus 262 B. a little bit by the argument, and when these bits are accumulated at the conclusion of the discussion mighty is their fallCf. 451 A, and Theaet. 166 A, 168 A, 534 C ἀπτῶτι. and the apparent contradiction of what they at first saidCf. Phaedr. 262 B, Cleitophon 410 A, Gorg. 495 A, schol.,τοὺς πρώτους λόγους τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ δηλονότι, Gorg. 457 E οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες, and also Agathon in Symp. 201 B.; and that just as by expert draught-playersFor this figure cf. Laws 739 A, 820 C-D, 903 D, Eryxias 395 A-B, Hipparchus 220 E, Eurip. Suppl. 409. Aristotle, Soph. El. 165 a 10 ff., borrows the metaphor, but his ψῆφοι are those of book-keeping or reckoning. Cf. also Dem. De cor. 227 f. the unskilled are finally shut in and cannot make a move, so they are finally blocked and have their mouths stopped by this other game of draughts played not with counters but with words; yet the truth is not affected by that outcome.Cf. Hipp. Minor 369 B-C and Grote ii. p. 64 Though Hippias admits each successive step he still mistrusts the conclusion also Apelt, p. 492, 357 A-B and Laws 903 A βιάζεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις, and also Hipparchus 232 B for the idea that dialectic constrains rather than persuades. In the Ion, 533 C, Ion says he cannot ἀντιλέγειν, but the fact remains that he knows Homer but not other poets. Cf. also 536 D. The passage virtually anticipates Bacon’s Novum Organum,App. XIII. (syllogismus) . . . assensum itaque constringit, non res. Cf. Cic. De fin. iv. 3, Tusc. i. 8. 16, and the proverbial οὐ γὰρ πείσεις, οὐδ’ ἢν πείσῃς,, Aristoph. Plutus 600. I say this with reference to the present case, for in this instance one might say that he is unable in words to contend against you at each question, but that when it comes to factsSee Soph. 234 E for a different application of the same idea. There is no change of opinion. The commonplace Greek contrast of word and deed, theory and fact, is valid against eristic but not against dialectic. See What Plato Said, p. 534 on Phaedo 99 E, and on 473 A; also What Plato Said, p. 625 on Laws 636 A. A favorite formula of Aristotle runs, This is true in theory and is confirmed by facts. Cf. Eth. Nic. 1099 b 25, 1123 b 22, 1131 a 13, Pol. 1323 a 39-b 6, 1326 a 25 and 29, 1334 a 5-6. he sees that of those who turn to philosophy,Scholars in politics cut a sorry figure. For this popular view of philosophers Cf. Theaet. 173 C ff., 174 C-D, Gorg. 484-486 C, Phaedo 64 B. Cf. also Isoc. passim, e. g. Antid. 250, 312. not merely touching upon it to complete their educationThe perfect tense is ironical in Crat. 384 B, serious in Laws 670 A-B. In Gorg. 485 A it is replaced by ὅσον παιδείας χάριν. and dropping it while still young, but lingering too longCf. What Plato Said, p. 506 on Gorg. 484 C. in the study of it, the majority become cranks,Cf. Euthydem. 306 E, Protag. 346 A, and for the idea without the word, Soph. 216 C. not to say rascals, and those accounted the finest spirits among them are still rendered uselessCf. Eurip. Medea 299, and on 489 B. to society by the pursuitCf. 497 A. In Euthydem. 307 B Plato uses both ἐπιτήδευμα and πρᾶγμα which you commend. And I, on hearing this, said, Do you think that they are mistaken in saying so? I don’t know, said he, but I would gladly hear your opinion. You may hear, then, that I think that what they say is true. How, then, he replied, can it be right to say that our cities will never be freed from their evils until the philosophers, whom we admit to be useless to them, become their rulers? Your question, I said, requires an answer expressed in a comparison or parable.Cf. Gory. 517 D, Laws 644 C, Symp. 215 A with Bury’s note. Cf. the parable of the great beast 493, and of the many-headed beast, 588-589. And you, he said, of course, are not accustomed to speak in comparisons!
