Book 9
580
And in addition, shall we not further attribute to him all that we spoke of before, and say that he must needs be, and, by reason of his rule, come to be still more than he was,Cf. 576 B-C. envious, faithless, unjust, friendless, impious, a vessel and nurse πανδοκεύς is a host or inn-keeper; Cf. Laws 918 B.Here the word is used figuratively. Cf. Aristoph. Wasps 35 φάλαινα πανδοκεύτρια, an all-receptive grampus (Rogers). of all iniquity, and so in consequence be himself most unhappyOn the wretched lot of the tyrant cf. Xen. Hiero passim, e.g. 4. 11, 6. 4, 8, 15. the Hiero is Xenophon’s rendering of the Socratico-Platonic conception of the unhappy tyrant. Cf. 1. 2-3. See too Gerhard Heintzeler, Das Bild des Tyrannen bei Platon, esp. pp. 43 ff. and 76 f.; Cic. De amicit. 15, Isoc. Nic. 4-5, Peace 112, Hel. 32 ff. But in Euag. 40 Isocrates says all men would admit that tyranny is the greatest and noblest and most coveted of all good things, both human and divine. In Epist. 6. 11. ff. he agrees with Plato that the life of a private citizen is better than the tyrant’s But in 2. 4 he treats this as a thesis which many maintain. Cf. further Gorg. 473 E, Alc. I. 135 B, Phaedr. 248 E, Symp. 182 C, Eurip. Ion 621 ff., Suppl. 429 ff., Medea 119 ff., I.A. 449-450, Herodotus iii. 80, Soph. Ajax 1350 not easy for a tyrant to be pious; also Dio Chrys. Or. iii. 58 f., Anon. Iambl. fr. 7. 12, Diels ii.3 p. 333, J. A. K. Thomson, Greek and Barbarian, pp. 111 ff., Dümmler, Prolegomena, p. 31, Baudrillart, J. Bodin et son temps, p. 292-293 Bodin semble . . . se souvenir de Platon flétrissant le tyran. . . . make all about him so? No man of sense will gainsay that, he said. Come then, said I, now at last, even as the judge of last instanceAdam has an exhaustive technical note on this. pronounces, so do you declare who in your opinion is first in happiness and who second, and similarly judge the others, all five in succession, the royal, the timocratic, the oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannical man. Nay, he said, the decision is easy. For as if they were choruses I judge them in the order of their entrance, and so rank them in respect of virtue and vice, happiness and its contrary. Shall we hire a herald,Cf. Phileb. 66 A ὑπό τε ἀγγέλων πέμπων, etc., Eurip. Alc. 737 κηρύκων ὕπο. Grote and other liberals are offended by the intensity of Plato’s moral conviction. See What Plato Said, p. 364, Laws 662-663, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p.25. then, said I, or shall I myself make proclamation that the son of Ariston pronounced the best manPlato puns on the name Ariston. For other such puns Cf. Gorg. 463 E, 481 D, 513 B, Rep. 600 B, 614 B, Symp. 174 B, 185 C, 198 C. and the most righteous to be the happiest,Cf. Laws 664 B-C. and that he is the one who is the most kingly and a king over himself;Cf. on 570 C, p. 367, note a. and declared that the most evil and most unjust is the most unhappy, who again is the man who, having the most of the tyrannical temper in himself, become, most of a tyrant over himself and over the state? Let it have been so proclaimed by you, he said. Shall I add the clause alike whether their character is known to all men and gods or is not knownCf. 367 E, 427 D, 445 A, 612 B.? Add that to the proclamation, he said. Very good, said I; this, then, would be one of our proofs, but examine this second one and see if there is anything in it. What is it? Since, said I, corresponding to the three types in the city, the soul also is tripartite,Cf. 435 B-C ff. it will admit,Practically all editors reject τὸ λογιστικόν. But Apelt, p. 525, insists that δέξεται cannot be used without a subject on the analogy of 453 D ἔοικεν, 497 C δηλώσει and δείξει, hence we must retain λογιστικόν, in the sense of ability to reckon, and he compares Charm. 174 B and the double sense of λογιστικόν in Rep. 525 B, 587 D, 602 E. He says it is a mild mathematical joke, like Polit. 257 A. I think, of another demonstration also. What is that? The following: The three parts have also, it appears to me, three kinds of pleasure, one peculiar to each, and similarly three appetites and controls. What do you mean? he said. One part, we say, is that with which a man learns, one is that with which he feels anger. But the third part, owing to its manifold forms,Cf. Phileb. 26 C τὸ . . . πλῆθος. Cf. Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 492, n. 2. we could not easily designate by any one distinctive name,Here again the concept is implied (Cf. on 564 B, p. 313, note e and Introd. pp. x-xi). Cf. Parmen. 132 C, 135 B, Phileb. 16 D, 18 C-D, 23 E, 25 C, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1130 b 2 ἑνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν, and εἰς ἓν κεφάλαιον ἀπερειδοίμεθα, 581 A, Schleiermacher’s interpretation of which, so würden wir uns in der Erklärung doch auf ein Hauptstück stützen, approved by Stallbaum, misses the point. For the point that there is no one name for it Cf. What Plato Said, p. 596, on Soph. 267 D. but gave it the name of its chief and strongest element;
