Book 9
581
for we called it the appetitive partVol. I. 439 D. because of the intensity of its appetites concerned with food and drink and love and their accompaniments, and likewise the money-loving part,Cf. Vol. I. p. 380, note b. because money is the chief instrument for the gratification of such desires. And rightly, he said. And if we should also say that its pleasure and its love were for gain or profit, should we not thus best bring it together under one headSince there is no one specific name for the manifold forms of this part (580 D-E), a makeshift term is to be used for convenience’s sake. See also p. 371, note e. in our discourse so as to understand each other when we speak of this part of the soul, and justify our calling it the money-loving and gain-loving part? I, at any rate, think so, he said. And, again, of the high-spirited element, do we not say that it is wholly set on predominance and victory and good repute? Yes, indeed. And might we not appropriately designate it as the ambitious part and that which is covetous of honor? Most appropriately. But surely it is obvious to everyone that all the endeavor of the part by which we learn is ever towardsOr is bent on, τέταται. Cf. 499 A ζητεῖν . . . τὸ ἀληθὲς συντεταμένως, Symp. 222 A and Bury ad loc., Symp. 186 B ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει. For the thought cf. also Phileb. 58 D. knowledge of the truth of things, and that it least of the three is concerned for wealth and reputation. Much the least. Lover of learningCf. Phaedo 67 B τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς. and lover of wisdom would be suitable designations for that. Quite so, he said. Is it not also true, I said, that the ruling principleCf. 338 D, 342 C. of men’s souls is in some cases this faculty and in others one of the other two, as it may happen? That is so, he said. And that is why we say that the primary classesCf. my review of Jowett in A.J.P. xiii. p. 366, which Adam quotes and follows and Jowett and Campbell (Republic) adopt. For the three types of men cf. also Phaedo 68 C, 82 C. Stewart, Aristot. Eth. Nic. p. 60 (1095 b 17), says, The three lives mentioned by Aristotle here answer to the three classes of men distinguished by Plato (Rep. 581). . . . Michelet and Grant point out that this threefold division occurs in a metaphor attributed to Pythagoras by Heracleides Ponticus (apud Cic. Tusc. v. 3). . . . Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1097 a-b (i. 5. 1), also Diog. L. vii. 130 on Stoics, Plutarch, De liber. educ. x. (8 A), Renan, Avenir de Ia science, p. 8. Isoc. Antid. 217 characteristically recognizes only the three motives, pleasure, gain, and honor. For the entire argument cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1176 a 31, 1177 a 10, and ibid, Introd. pp. liv-lv. of men also are three, the philosopher or lover of wisdom, the lover of victory and the lover of gain. Precisely so And also that there are three forms of pleasure, corresponding respectively to each? By all means. Are you aware, then said I, that if you should choose to ask men of these three classes, each in turn,For ἐν μέρει cf. 468 B, 520 C and D, 577 C, 615 A, Gorg. 496 B, Laws 876 B, 943 A, 947 C, Polit. 265 A; Contrasted with ἐν τῷ μέρει, Meno 92 E, Gorg. 462 A, 474 A. The two expressions, similar in appearance, illustrate how a slight change alters an idiom. So e.g. καινὸν οὐδέν (Gorg. 448 A) has nothing to do with the idiom οὐδὲν καινόν (Phaedo 100 B);τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα (Rep. 612 C) is different from λόγου ἕνεκα (Theaet. 191 C—dicis causa);πάντα τἀγαθά (Laws 631 B) has no connection with the idiomatic πάντ’ ἀγαθά (Rep. 471 C, Cf. supra ad loc.); nor Pindar’s πόλλ’ ἄνω τὰ δ’ αὖ κάτω (Ol. xii. 6) with ἄνω κάτω as used in Phaedo 96 B, Gorg. 481 D, etc. Cf. also ἐν τέχνῃ Prot. 319 C with ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ317 C,νῷ ἔχειν Rep. 490 A with ἐν νῷ ἔχειν344 D, etc.,τοῦ παντὸς ἡμάρτηκεν Phaedr. 235 E with παντὸς ἁμαρτάνειν237 C. The same is true of words—to confuse καλλίχορος with καλλίχοιρος would be unfortunate; and the medieval debates about ὁμοουσία and ὁμοιουσία were perhaps not quite as ridiculous as they are generally considered. which is the most pleasurable of these lives, each will chiefly commend his ownCf. Laws 658 on judging different kinds of literature.? The financier will affirm that in comparison with profit the pleasures of honor or of learning area of no value except in so far as they produce money. True, he said. And what of the lover of honorCf. p. 255, note f, on 549 A. Xenophon is the typical φιλότιμος. In Mem. iii. 3. 13 he says that the Athenians excel others in love of honor, which is the strongest incentive to deeds of honor and renown (Marchant, Loeb tr.). Cf. Epist. 320 A, Symp. 178 D, and also Xen. Cyrop. i. 2. 1, Mem. iii. i. 10.? I said; does he not regard the pleasure that comes from money as vulgarCf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1095 b 16, and on 528 E. and low, and again that of learning, save in so far as the knowledge confers honor, mere fumeCf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 920, and Turgeniev’s novel, Smoke. and moonshine? It is so, he said. And what, said I, are we to suppose the philosopher thinks of the other pleasures compared with the delight of knowing the truthCf. Phileb. 58 C on dialectic. and the reality, and being always occupied with that while he learns? Will he not think them far removed from true pleasure,Cf. 598 B, Epist. iii. 315 C, Marc. Aurel. viii. 1 πόρρω φιλοσοφίας. Hermann’s text or something like it is the only idiomatic one, and τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω must express the philosopher’s opinion of the pleasurableness of the lower pleasures as compared with the higher. Cf. A.J.P. xiii. p. 366. and callFor the infinitive cf. 492 C καὶ φήσειν, 530 B καὶ ζητεῖν. them literally τῷ ὄντι marks the etymological use of ἀναγκαίας. Cf. on 511 B and 551 E, p. 266, note a. the pleasures of necessity,Cf. 558 D f. since he would have no use for them if necessity were not laid upon him?
