Book 9
582
We may be sure of that, he said. Since, then, there is contention between the several types of pleasure and the lives themselves, not merely as to which is the more honorable or the more base, or the worse or the better, but which is actually the more pleasurableThis anticipates Laws 663 A, 733 A-B, 734 A-B. or free from pain, how could we determine which of them speaks most truly? In faith, I cannot tell, he said. Well, consider it thus: By what are things to be judged, if they are to be judgedi.e. what is the criterion? Cf. 582 D δι’ οὗ, Sext. Empir. Bekker, p. 60 (Pyrrh. Hypotyp. ii. 13-14) and p. 197 (Adv. Math. vii. 335). Cf. Diog. L. Prologue 21, and Laches 184 E. For the idea that the better judge cf. also Laws 663 C, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1176 a 16-19. rightly? Is it not by experience, intelligence and discussionCf. 582 D, On Virtue 373 D, Xen. Mem. iii. 3. 11.? Or could anyone name a better criterion than these? How could he? he said. Observe, then. Of our three types of men, which has had the most experience of all the pleasures we mentioned? Do you think that the lover of gain by study of the very nature of truth has more experience of the pleasure that knowledge yields than the philosopher has of that which results from gain? There is a vast difference, he said; for the one, the philosopher, must needs taste of the other two kinds of pleasure from childhood; but the lover of gain is not only under no necessity of tasting or experiencing the sweetness of the pleasure of learning the true natures of things,The force of οὐ extends through the sentence. Cf. Class. Phil. vi. (1911) p. 218, and my note on Tim. 77 a in A.J.P. p. 74. Cf. Il. v. 408, xxii, 283, Pindar, Nem. iii. 15, Hymn Dem. 157. but he cannot easily do so even if he desires and is eager for it. The lover of wisdom, then, said I, far surpasses the lover of gain in experience of both kinds of pleasure. Yes, far. And how does he compare with the lover of honor? Is he more unacquainted with the pleasure of being honored than that other with that which comes from knowledge? Nay, honor, he said, if they achieve their several objects, attends them all; for the rich man is honored by many and the brave man and the wise, so that all are acquainted with the kind of pleasure that honor brings; but it is impossible for anyone except the lover of wisdom to have savored the delight that the contemplation of true being and reality brings. Then, said I, so far as experience goes, he is the best judge of the three. By far. And again, he is the only one whose experience will have been accompaniedFor the periphrasis γεγονὼς ἔσται Cf. Charm. 174 D ἀπολελοιπὸς ἔσται. by intelligence. Surely. And yet again, that which is the instrument, or ὄργανον, of judgementCf. 508 B, 518 C, 527 D. is the instrument, not of the lover of gain or of the lover of honor, but of the lover of wisdom. What is that? It was by means of words and discussionCf. on 582 A, p. 376, note d. that we said the judgement must be reached; was it not? Yes. And they are the instrument mainly of the philosopher. Of course. Now if wealth and profit were the best criteria by which things are judged, the things praised and censured by the lover of gain would necessarily be truest and most real. Quite necessarily. And if honor, victory and courage, would it not be the things praised by the lover of honor and victory? Obviously. But since the tests are experience and wisdom and discussion, what follows? Of necessity, he said, that the things approved by the lover of wisdom and discussion are most valid and true.
