Book 12
963
Ath. You follow us admirably, Clinias; and now follow us in what comes next. In the case of the pilot, the doctor, and the general, reason is directed, as we said, towards the one object of aim which is proper in each case; and now we are at the point of examining reason in the case of a statesman, and, addressing it as a man, we shall question it thus:—O admirable sir, what is your aim? Medical reason is able to state clearly the one single object at which it aims; so will you be unable to state your one object—you who are superior, as perhaps you will say, to all the wise? Can you two, Megillus and Clinias, define that object on his behalf, and tell me what you say it is, just as I, on behalf of many others, defined their objects for you?
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Clin. We are totally unable to do so.
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Ath. Well then, can you declare that we need zeal in discerning both the object itself as a whole and the forms it assumes?
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Clin. Illustrate what you mean by the forms you speak of.
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Ath. For example, when we said that there are four forms of virtue, obviously, since there are four, we must assert that each is a separate one.
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Clin. Certainly.
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Ath. And yet we call them all by one name: we assert that courage is virtue, and wisdom virtue, and the other two likewise, as though they were really not a plurality, but solely this one thing—virtue.
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Clin. Very true.
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Ath. Now it is not hard to explain wherein these two (and the rest) differ from one another, and how they have got two names; but to explain why we have given the one name virtue to both of them (and to the rest) is no longer an easy matter.
963
Clin. How do you mean?
963
Ath. It is not hard to make clear my meaning. Let one of us adopt the role of questioner, the other of answerer.Cp. Plat. Laws 893a.
963
Clin. In what way?
