Book 12
963
Ath. Do you ask me this question—why, when calling both the two by the single name of virtue, did we again speak of them as two—courage and wisdom? Then I shall tell you the reason,—which is, that the one of them has to do with fear, namely courage,Cp. Plat. Lach. 196d ff., Plat. Prot. 349b ff. in which beasts also share, and the characters of very young children; for a courageous soul comes into existence naturally and without reasoning, but without reasoning there never yet came into existence, and there does not nor ever will exist, a soul that is wise and rational, it being a distinct kind.
963
Clin. That is true.
964
Ath. Wherein they differ and are two you have now learnt from my reply. So do you, in turn, inform me how it is that they are one and identical. Imagine you are also going to tell me how it is that, though four, they are yet one; and then, after you have shown me how they are one, do you again ask me how they are four. And after that, let us enquire regarding the person who has full knowledge of any objects which possess both a name and a definition, whether he ought to know the name only, and not know the definition, or whether it is not a shameful thing for a man worth anything to be ignorant of all these points in regard to matters of surpassing beauty and importance.
964
Clin. It would certainly seem to be so.
964
Ath. For the lawgiver and the Law-warden, and for him who thinks he surpasses all men in virtue and who has won prizes for just such qualities, is there anything more important than these very qualities with which we are now dealing—courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom?
964
Clin. Impossible.
