Book 2
667
Ath. Then we shall rightly judge by the criterion of pleasure that object only which, in its effects, produces neither utility nor truth nor similarity, nor yet harm, and which exists solely for the sake of the concomitant element of charm,—which element will best be named pleasure whenever it is accompanied by none of the other qualities mentioned.
667
Clin. You mean only harmless pleasure.
667
Ath. Yes, and I say that this same pleasure is also play, whenever the harm or good it does is negligible.
667
Clin. Very true.
668
Ath. Should we not then assert, as a corollary, that no imitation should be judged by the criterion of pleasure or of untrue opinion, nor indeed should any kind of equality be so judged? The reason why the equal is equal, or the symmetrical symmetrical, is not at all because a man so opines, or is charmed thereby, but most of all because of truth, and least of all for any other reason.
668
Clin. Most certainly.
668
Ath. We assert, do we not, that all music is representative and imitative?
668
Clin. Of course.
668
Ath. So whenever a man states that pleasure is the criterion of music, we shall decisively reject his statement; and we shall regard such music as the least important of all (if indeed any music is important) and prefer that which possesses similarity in its imitation of the beautiful.
668
Clin. Very true.
668
Ath. Thus those who are seeking the best singing and music must seek, as it appears, not that which is pleasant, but that which is correct; and the correctness of imitation consists, as we say, in the reproduction of the original in its own proper quantity and quality.
668
Clin. Of course.
668
Ath. And this is certainly true of music, as everyone would allow,—that all its productions are imitative and representative; Cp. Plat. Laws 655d, above. The music (songs and tunes) of dramatic compositions is specially alluded to. that much, at least, they would all admit,—poets, audience, and actors alike, would they not?
668
Clin. They would.
