Book 3
696
Ath. And, as our argument asserts, the cause of this does not lie in luck, but in the evil life which is usually lived by the sons of excessively rich monarchs; for such an upbringing can never produce either boy or man or greybeard of surpassing goodness. To this, we say, the lawgiver must give heed,—as must we ourselves on the present occasion. It is proper, however, my Lacedaemonian friends, to give your State credit for this at least,—that you assign no different honor or training whatsoever to poverty or wealth, to the commoner or the king, beyond what your original oracleThe laws of Lycurgus. declared at the bidding of some god. Nor indeed is it right that pre-eminent honors in a State should be conferred on a man because he is specially wealthy, any more than it is right to confer them because he is swift or comely or strong without any virtue, or with a virtue devoid of temperance.
696
Meg. What do you mean by that, Stranger?
696
Ath. Courage is, presumably, one part of virtue.
696
Meg. Certainly.
696
Ath. Now that you have heard the argument, judge for yourself whether you would welcome as housemate or neighbor a man who is extremely courageous, but licentious rather than temperate.
696
Meg. Don’t suggest such a thing!
696
Ath. Well then,—a man wise in arts and crafts, but unjust.
696
Meg. Certainly not.
696
Ath. But justice, surely, is not bred apart from temperance.
696
Meg. Impossible.
696
Ath. Nor is he whom we recently proposedCp. Plat. Laws 689d. as our type of wisdom,—the man who has his feelings of pleasure and pain in accord with the dictates of right reason and obedient thereto.
696
Meg. No, indeed.
696
Ath. Here is a further point we must consider, in order to judge about the conferment of honors in States, when they are right and when wrong.
696
Meg. What point?
696
Ath. If temperance existed alone in a man’s soul, divorced from all the rest of virtue, would it justly be held in honor or the reverse?
696
Meg. I cannot tell what reply to make.
