Book 9
11.78
Thus the Pyrrhonean principle, as Aenesidemus says in the introduction to his Pyrrhonics, is but a report on phenomena or on any kind of judgement, a report in which all things are brought to bear on one another, and in the comparison are found to present much anomaly and confusion. As to the contradictions in their doubts, they would first show the ways in which things gain credence, and then by the same methods they would destroy belief in them; for they say those things gain credence which either the senses are agreed upon or which never or at least rarely change, as well as things which become habitual or are determined by law and those which please or excite wonder.
11.79
They showed, then, on the basis of that which is contrary to what induces belief, that the probabilities on both sides are equal.
11.79
Perplexities arise from the agreementsIf, however, with Reiske we here read τῆς for τὰς, the meaning is: The objections urged against the (supposed) consistency of our percepts or our concepts, were arranged by them under ten modes. between appearances or judgements, and these perplexities they distinguished under ten different modes in which the subjects in question appeared to vary. The following are the ten modes laid down.Cf. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp.i. §§ 36-163.
11.79
The first mode relates to the differences between living creatures in respect of those things which give them pleasure or pain, or are useful or harmful to them. By this it is inferred that they do not receive the same impressions from the same things, with the result that such a conflict necessarily leads to suspension of judgement. For some creatures multiply without intercourse, for example, creatures that live in fire, the Arabian phoenix and worms; others by union, such as man and the rest.
