Book 9
11.107
Against this criterion of appearances the dogmatic philosophers urge that, when the same appearances produce in us different impressions, e.g. a round or square tower, the Sceptic, unless he gives the preference to one or other, will be unable to take any course; if on the other hand, say they, he follows either view, he is then no longer allowing equal value to all apparent facts. The Sceptics reply that, when different impressions are produced, they must both be said to appeari.e. the one has as much right to be called an appearance as the other.; for things which are apparent are so called because they appear. The end to be realized they hold to be suspension of judgement, which brings with it tranquillity like its shadow: so Timon and Aenesidemus declare.
11.108
For in matters which are for us to decide we shall neither choose this nor shrink from that; and things which are not for us to decide but happen of necessity, such as hunger, thirst and pain, we cannot escape,Τὰ δ’ ὅσα περὶ ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἀνάγκην, οὐ δυνάμεθα φεύγειν. This is explained by Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. i. 29 ὀχλεῖς θαίφαμεν (sc. τὸν σκεπτικὸν) ὑπὸ τῶν κατηναγκα σμένων· For we admit that we feel cold, that we are thirsty, etc. for they are not to be removed by force of reason. And when the dogmatists argue that he may thus live in such a frame of mind that he would not shrink from killing and eating his own father if ordered to do so, the Sceptic replies that he will be able so to live as to suspend his judgement in cases where it is a question of arriving at the truth, but not in matters of life and the taking of precautions. Accordingly we may choose a thing or shrink from a thing by habit and may observe rules and customs. According to some authorities the end proposed by the Sceptics is insensibility; according to others, gentleness.i.e. a calm, the opposite of an excitable, temperament: cf. Plato, Lys. 211 e πρᾁως ἔχω.
Chapter 12. TIMON (c. 320-2 30 B.C.)
