Book 2
10
And since we have dealt with the scheme of states of character in respect of the various emotions in which there are excesses and deficiencies, and of the opposite states in accordance with which men are disposed in accordance with right principle (though the question what is the right principle and what rule is to guide us in defining the mean must be considered laterSee 1249a 21 ff.), it is evident that all the forms of moral goodness and badness have to do with excesses and deficiencies of pleasures and pains, and that pleasures and pains result from the states of character and modes of emotion mentioned.
11
But then the best state in relation to each class of thing is the middle state. It is clear, therefore, that the virtues will be either all or some of these middle states.
1
Let us, therefore, take another starting-point for the ensuing inquiry.The writer proceeds to distinguish the strict sense ἀρχή, origin or cause of change (which applies to man as capable of volition and action) from its secondary sense, cause or explanation of an unchanging state of things (which applies to the first principles of mathematics). Now all essences are by nature first principles of a certain kind, owing to which each is able to generate many things of the same sort as itself, for example a man engenders men, and in general an animal animals, and a plant plants.
2
And in addition to this, obviously man alone among animals initiates certain conduct—for we should not ascribe conduct to any of the others.
3
And the first principles of that sort, which are the first source of motions, are called first principles in the strict sense, and most rightly those that have necessary results; doubtless God is a ruling principle that acts in this way.
