Book 2
20
Hence inasmuch as if a man of his own accord and not through ignorance does or refrains from doing something resting with himself either to do or not to do, he acts or refrains from acting voluntarily, but yet we do many such things without deliberation or previous thought, it necessarily follows that, although all that has been purposively chosen is voluntary, voluntary is not the same as chosen, and, although all things done by purposive choice are voluntary, not all things voluntary are done by purposive choice.
21
And at the same time it is clear from these considerations that the classification of offences made by legislators as in voluntary, voluntary and premeditated is a good one; for even if it is not precisely accurate, yet at all events it approximates to the truth in a way.
22
But we will speak about this in our examination of justice.Not in Eud. Eth., but cf. Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1135a 16ff. As to purposive choice, it is clear that it is not absolutely identical with wish nor with opinion, but is opinion plus appetition when these follow as a conclusion from deliberation.
22
But since one who deliberates always deliberates for the sake of some object, and a man deliberating always has some aim in view with reference to which he considers what is expedient, nobody deliberates about his End, but this is a starting-point or assumption,
23
like the postulates in the theoretic sciences (we have spoken about this briefly at the beginning of this discourse, and in detail in AnalyticsSee Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1214b 6ff., and Aristot. Anal. Post. 72a 20 and context.); whereas with all men deliberation whether technical or untechnical is about the means that lead to their End, e.g. when they deliberate about whether to go to war or not to go to war with a given person.
