Book 2
1
It is clear, therefore, that Moral Goodness has to do with pleasures and pains. And since moral character is, as even its name implies that it has its growth from habit,ἦθος derived from ἔθος by lengthening of ε to η: cf. Aristot. Nic. Eth. 2.3.4 This clause and the one following interrupt the construction of the sentence. and by our often moving in a certain way a habit not innate in us is finally trained to be operative in that way (which we do not observe in inanimate objects, for not even if you throw a stone upwards ten thousand times will it ever rise upward unless under the operation of force)—let moral character then be defined as a quality of the spirit in accordance with governing reason that is capable of following the reason.
2
We have then to say what is the part of the spirit in respect of which our moral characters are of a certain quality.
3
And it will be in respect of our faculties for emotions according to which people are termed liable to some emotion, and also of the states of character according to which people receive certain designations in respect of the emotions, because of their experiencing or being exempt from some form of emotion.
4
After this comes the classification, made in previous discussions,Perhaps a reference to Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1105b 20, inserted in the belief that the Eudemian Ethics is the later work. of the modes of emotion, the faculties and the states of character. By emotions I mean such things as anger, fear, shame, desire, and generally those experiences that are in themselves usually accompanied by sensory pleasure or pain.
