Book 3
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The opposition existing between the mean and the extremes does not seem to be the same in the case of both the extremes, but sometimes the greater opposition is by way of excess, sometimes by way of deficiency.
15
The causes of this are partly the two first mentioned,Cf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1222a 22-b 4. rarity (for example, the rarity of people insensitive to pleasant things) and the fact that the error to which we are more prone seems more opposite to the mean,
16
and thirdly the fact that the extreme that more resembles the mean seems less opposite to it, as is the case with daring in relation to boldnessOr, confidence ; but perhaps the Greek should be altered to give courage. and extravagance in relation to liberality.
16
We have therefore sufficiently discussed the other praiseworthy virtues, and must now speak about Justice.Books 4, 5, and 6 are omitted, as they are identical with Books 5, 6, and 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics.
