Book 7
32
The case of the pleasant also, therefore, is similar. For here we must pause and consider whether there is any friendship without pleasure,and how such a friendship differs from other friendship, and on which exactly of the two thingsGoodness and pleasantness. the affection depends—do we love a man because he is good even if he is not pleasant, but not because he is pleasant?Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give or not, but because he is pleasant. Then, affection having two meanings,Potential and actual (Solomon). does actual affection seem to involve pleasure because activity is good?
33
It is clear that as in science recent studies and acquirements are most fully apprehended, because of their pleasantness, Ross marks this clause as corrupted. so with the recognition of familiar things, and the principle is the same in both cases. By nature at all events the absolutely good is absolutely pleasant, and the relatively good is pleasant to those for whom it is good.Sc. (τὸ τοισδὶ ἀγαθόν) οἷς ἀγαθόν, τούτοις ἡδύ.
34
Hence ipso facto like takes pleasure in like, and man is the thing most pleasant to man; so that as this is so even with imperfect things, it is clearly so with things when perfected, and a good man is a perfect man. And if active affection is the reciprocal choice, accompanied by pleasure, of one another’s acquaintance, it is clear that friendship of the primary kind is in general the reciprocal choice of things absolutely good and pleasant because they are good and pleasant;
35
and friendship itself is a state from which such choice arises. For its function is an activity, but this not external but within the lover himself; whereas the function of every faculty is external, for it is either in another or in oneself qua other.
