Book 7
36
Hence to love is to feel pleasure but to be loved is not; for being loved is not an activity of the thing loved, whereas loving is an activity—the activity of friendship; and loving occurs only in an animate thing, whereas being loved occurs with an inanimate thing also, for even inanimate things are loved.
37
And since to love actively is to treat the loved object qua loved, and the friend is an object of love to the friend qua dear to him but not qua musician or medical man, the pleasure of friendship is the pleasure derived from the person himself qua himself; for the friend loves him as himself, not because he is something else. Consequently if he does not take pleasure in him qua good, it is not the primary friendship.
38
Nor ought any accidental quality to cause more hindrance than the friend’s goodness causes delight; for surely, if a person is very evil-smelling, people cut him—he must be content with our goodwill, he must not expect our society!
38
This then is the primary friendship, which all people recognize.
39
It is on account of it that the other sorts are considered to be friendship, and also that their claim is disputed—for friendship seems to be some thing stable, and only this friendship is stable; for a formed judgement is stable, and not doing things quickly or easily makes the judgement right.
40
And there is no stable friendship without confidence, and confidence only comes with time; for it is necessary to make trial, as Theognis says: You cannot know the mind of man nor woman Before have you tried them as you try cattle. Theog. 125f. Those who become friends without the test of time are not real friends but only wish to be friends; and such a character very readily passes for friendship,
