Book 7
2
But another variety of these kinds is friendship on a basis of superiority, as in that of a god for a man,for that is a different kind of friendship, and generally of a ruler and subject; just as the principle of justice between them is also different, being one of equality proportionally but not of equality numerically.Between two unequal persons justice divides benefits in proportion to their deserts, so that the two shares are not equal to each other but each equal to its recipient’s merit. The word ἴσον itself connotes fair, just, reasonable. The friendship of father for son is in this class, and that of benefactor for beneficiary.
3
And of these sorts of friendship themselves there are varieties: the friendship of father for son is different from that of husband for wife—the former is friendship as between ruler and subject, the latter that of benefactor for beneficiary. And in these varieties either there is no return of affection or it is not returned in a similar way.
4
For it would be ludicrous if one were to accuse God because he does not return love in the same way as he is loved, or for a subject to make this accusation against a ruler; for it is the part of a ruler to be loved, not to love, or else to love in another way.
5
And the pleasure differs; the pleasure that a man of established position has in his own property or son and that which one who lacks them feels in an estate or a child coming to him are not one and the same.
6
And in the same way also in the case of those who are friends for utility or for pleasure—some are on a footing of equality, others one of superiority. Owing to this those who think they are on the former footing complain if they are not useful and beneficial in a similar manner; and also in the case of pleasure.i.e. they complain if the pleasure or benefit they get from their friend is not equal (absolutely, not merely in proportion to a supposed difference of merit) to that which they give to him.
