Book 7
13
This is the case with a good man and one whose friendship is based on goodness, because assuredly an evil man is not a single individual but many, and a different person in the same day, and full of caprice. Hence a man’s affection for himself carries back to love of the good;for because in a way a man is like himself and a single person and good to himself, in this way he is dear and desirable to himself. And a man is like that by nature, but a wicked man is contrary to nature.
14
But a good man does not rebuke himself either at the time, like the uncontrolled, nor yet his former self his later, like the penitent, nor his later self his former, like the liar—
15
(and generally, if it is necessary to distinguish as the sophists do, he is related to himself as John Styles is related to good John Styles See Sophistici Elenchi 175b 15ff. Coriscus is used for any imaginary person, cf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1220a 19 f.; for it is clear that the same amount of John Styles is good as of good John Styles )—because when men blame themselves they are murdering their own personalities, whereas everybody seems to himself good. And he who is absolutely good seeks to be dear even to himself, as has been said,ll. 13-21. because he has two factors within him which by nature desire to be friendly and which it is impossible to draw asunder.
16
Therefore in the case of man each individual seems dear to himself, although in the case of other animals it is not so, for example a horse to itself . . .Some words seem to have been lost here. so it is not dear to itself. But neither are children, but only when they have come to possess purposive choice; for when that point is reached the mind is at variance with the appetite.
17
And affection for oneself resembles the affection of relationship: neither connection is in people’s own power to dissolve, but even if the parties quarrel, nevertheless relatives are still relatives and the individual is still one as long as he lives.
