Book 8
9
and what is befitting is fine, and these things befit him—wealth, birth, power. Hence for the noble man the same things are both advantageous and fine; but for the multitude these things do not coincide, for things absolutely good are not also good for them, whereas they are good for the good man; and to the noble man they are also fine, for he performs many fine actions because of them.
10
But he who thinks that one ought to possess the virtues for the sake of external goods does fine things only by accident.
10
Nobility then is perfect goodness.
11
We have also spoken about the nature of pleasure and the manner in which it is a good, and have said that things pleasant absolutely are also fine and that things good absolutely are also pleasant. Pleasure does not occur except in action;on this account the truly happy man will also live most pleasantly, and it is not without reason that people demand this.
12
But since a doctor has a certain standard by referring to which he judges the healthy body and the goods unhealthy, and in relation to which each thing up to a certain point ought to be done and is wholesome, but if less is done, or more, it ceases to be wholesome, so in regard to actions and choices of things good by nature but not laudable a virtuous man ought to have a certain standard both of character and of choice and avoidance; and also in regard to large and small amount of property and of good fortune.
13
Now in what preceded Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1222a 6-10, b 7, 1232a 32f. we stated the standard as reason directs ; but this is as if in matters of diet one were to say as medical science and its principles direct, and this though true is not clear.
14
It is proper, therefore, here as in other matters to live with reference to the ruling factor, and to the state and the activity of the ruling factor, as for example slave must live with reference to the rule of master, and each person with reference to the rule appropriate to each.
