Book 1
17
But this second element also seems, as we said, to participate in rational principle; at least in the self-restrained man it obeys the behest of principle—and no doubt in the temperate and brave man it is still more amenable, for all parts of his nature are in harmony with principle.
18
Thus we see that the irrational part, as well as the soul as a whole, is double. One division of it, the vegetative, does not share in rational principle at all; the other, the seat of the appetites and of desire in general, does in a sense participate in principle, as being amenable and obedient to it (in the sense in fact in which we speak of paying heed to one’s father and friends, not in the sense of the term rational in mathematicsThis parenthetical note on the phrase to have logos is untranslatable, and confusing even in the Greek. According to the psychology here expounded, the intellect has a plan or principle, in the sense of understanding principle, and being able to reason and make a plan: in other words, it is fully rational. The appetitive part of man’s nature has a plan or principle in so far as it is capable of following or obeying a principle. It happens that this relationship of following or obeying can itself be expressed by the words to have logos in another sense of that phrase, viz. to take account of, pay heed to. To be precise the writer should say that the appetitive part λόγον ἔχει τοῦ λόγου has logos (takes account) of the logos. The phrase has yet a third sense in mathematics, where “to have logos” (ratio) means to be rational in the sense of commensurable.). And that principle can in a manner appeal to the irrational part, is indicated by our practice of admonishing delinquents, and by our employment of rebuke and exhortation generally.
