Book 3
1
Virtue however is concerned with emotions and actions, and it is only voluntary feelings and actions for which praise and blame are given; those that are involuntary are condoned, and sometimes even pitied. Hence it seems to be necessary for the student of ethics to define the difference between the Voluntary and the Involuntaryἑκούσιον and ἀκούσιον are most conveniently rendered voluntary and involuntary; but the word ἀκούσιον suggests unwilling or against the will, and to this meaning Aristotle limits it in 1.13. There he introduces a third term, οὐχ ἑκούσιον, not voluntary or not willing, to describe acts done in ignorance of their full circumstances and consequences, and so not willed in the full sense; but such acts when subsequently regretted by the agent are included in the class of ἀκούσια or unwilling acts, because had the agent not been in ignorance he would not have done them.; and this will also be of service to the legislator in assigning rewards and punishments.
2
It is then generally held that actions are involuntary when done (a) under compulsion or (b) through ignorance;
3
and that (a) an act is compulsory when its origin is from without, being of such a nature that the agent, who is really passive, contributes nothing to it: for example, when a ship’s captain is carried somewhere by stress of weather, or by people who have him in their power.
4
But there is some doubt about actions done through fear of a worse alternative, or for some noble object— as for instance if a tyrant having a man’s parents and children in his power commands him to do something base, when if he complies their lives will be spared but if he refuses they will be put to death. It is open to question whether such actions are voluntary or involuntary.
5
A somewhat similar case is when cargo is jettisoned in a storm; apart from circumstances, no one voluntarily throws away his property, but to save his own life and that of his shipmates any sane man would do so.
