Book 3
5
for the noble and the pleasant have a special form corresponding to each of the faculties of our nature, and perhaps what chiefly distinguishes the good man is that he sees the truth in each kind, being himself as it were the standard and measure of the noble and pleasant. It appears to be pleasure that misleads the mass of mankind; for it seems to them to be a good, though it is not,
6
so they choose what is pleasant as good and shun pain as evil.
1
If then whereas we wish for our end, the means to our end are matters of deliberation and choice, it follows that actions dealing with these means are done by choice, and voluntary. But the activities in which the virtues are exercised deal with means.
2
Therefore virtue also depends on ourselves. And so also does vice. For where we are free to act we are also free to refrain from acting, and where we are able to say No we are also able to say Yes; if therefore we are responsible for doing a thing when to do it is right, we are also responsible for not doing it when not to do it is wrong, and if we are responsible for rightly not doing a thing, we are also responsible for wrongly doing it.
3
But if it is in our power to do and to refrain from doing right and wrong, and if, as we saw,2.11. being good or bad is doing right or wrong, it consequently depends on us whether we are virtuous or vicious.
4
To say that None would be vile, and none would not be blest Anon. Possibly a verse of Solon. Doubtless πονηρός, translated vile to suit the context here, in the original meant wretched. seems to be half false, though half true: it is true that no one is unwilling to be blessed, but not true that wickedness is involuntary;
5
or else we must contradict what we just now3.15. asserted, and say that man is not the originator and begetter of his actions as he is of his children.
