Book 5
3
That rules of justice vary is not absolutely true, but only with qualifications. Among the gods indeed it is perhaps not true at all; but in our world,The order of the following sentences seems confused. With the transpositions suggested by Richards, and the emendations given in the critical notes, they will run: But in our world, although there is such a thing as natural law, yet everything is capable of change. For example, the right hand is naturally stronger than the left, yet it is possible for some persons to be born ambidextrous; and the same distinction will hold good in all matters; though what sort of things that admit of variation are as they are by nature, and what are merely customary and conventional, it is not easy to see, inasmuch as both alike are capable of change. But nevertheless some things are ordained by nature and others not. although there is such a thing as Natural Justice, all rules of justice are variable. But nevertheless there is such a thing as Natural Justice as well as justice not ordained by nature;
4
and it is easyPerhaps Aristotle wrote though is is not easy. to see which rules of justice, though not absolute, are natural, and which are not natural but legal and conventional, both sorts alike being variable. The same distinction will hold good in all other matters; for instance, the right hand is naturally stronger than the left, yet it is possible for any man to make himself ambidextrous.
5
The rules of justice based on convention and expediency are like standard measures. Corn and wine measures are not equal in all places, but are larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets. Similarly the rules of justice ordained not by nature but by man are not the same in all places, since forms of government are not the same, though in all places there is only one form of government that is natural, namely, the best form.
