Book 5
7
Now it appears that the terms Justice and Injustice are used in several senses, but as the equivocal uses are closely connected, the equivocation is not detected; whereas in the case of widely different things called by a common name, the equivocation is comparatively obvious: for example (the difference being considerable when it is one of external form), the equivocal use of the word kleis (key) to denote both the boneThe clavicle (clavis, a key), or collar-bone. at the base of the neck and the instrument with which we lock our doors.
8
Let us then ascertain in how many senses a man is said to be unjust. Now the term unjust is held to apply both to the man who breaks the law and the man who takes more than his due, the unfairThe word ἴσος means both equal and equitable or fair. man. Hence it is clear that the law-abiding man and the fair man will both be just. The just therefore means that which is lawful and that which is equal or fair, and the unjust means that which is illegal and that which is unequal or unfair.
9
Again, as the unjust man is one who takes the larger share, he will be unjust in respect of good things; not all good things, but those on which good and bad fortune depend. These though always good in the absolute sense, are not always good for a particular person. Yet these are the goods men pray for and pursue, although they ought not to do so; they ought, while choosing the things that are good for them, to pray that what is good absolutely may also be good for them.
10
The unjust man does not however always choose the larger share: of things that, speaking absolutely, are bad he chooses the smaller share; but nevertheless he is thought to take more than his due, because the lesser of two evils seems in a sense to be a good, and taking more than one’s due means taking more than one’s due of good.
