Book 6
3
while on the other hand all matters of conduct belong to the class of particular and ultimate things (since the prudent man admittedly has to take cognizance of these things), and Understanding and Consideration deal with matters of conduct, which are ultimate.
4
Also Intelligence apprehends the ultimates in both aspects—since ultimates as well as primary definitionsSee 8.9. are grasped by Intelligence and not reached by reasoning: in demonstrations, Intelligence apprehends the immutable and primary definitions, in practical inferences,The substantive to be understood may be προτάσεσι, propositions; but the reference seems to be not to the practical syllogism in the ordinary sense (see 7.3.9), but to the establishment of ethical ἀρχαί by induction, which is the proper method of Ethics (1.4.5-7). This induction is conceived as a syllogism (cf. Aristot. Pr. Anal. 2.23.): Actions A, B, C . . . are desirable; Actions A, B, C . . .possess the quality Z; therefore all actions possessing the quality Z are desirable. Here both the major and the minor premise are sets of particular propositions intuitively seen to be true: νοῦς is τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα. it apprehends the ultimate and contingent fact, and the minor, premise, since these are the first principles from which the end is inferred, as general rules are based on particular cases; hence we must have perception of particulars, and this immediate perception is Intelligence.Here the intuitive element in Prudence, as well as in Wisdom (chaps. 5, 6.), is termed Intelligence: at 8.9 it was called merely Prudence, in contrast with Intelligence, which was limited to intuition of the first principles of science. Here then νοῦς approximates to its popular sense (see 12.3, note).
5
This is why it is thought that these qualities are a natural gift, and that a man is considerate, understanding and intelligent by nature, though no one is a wise man by nature.
