Book 6
6
That this is so is indicated by our thinking of them as going with certain ages: we say that at such and such an age a man must have got intelligence and considerateness, which implies that they come by nature.
6
[Hence Intelligence is both a beginning and an end, for these things are both the starting-point and the subject matter of demonstration.]This sentence seems irrelevant here. It might come in after 11.4.
6
Consequently the unproved assertions and opinions of experienced and elderly people, or of prudent men,This addition is auspicious: no one can become prudent merely by getting old ( Burnet). are as much deserving of attention as those which they support by proof; for experience has given them an eye for things, and so they see correctly.
7
We have now discussed the nature and respective spheres of Prudence and Wisdom, and have shown that each is the virtue of a different part of the soul.
1
But the further question may be raised, What is the use of these intellectual virtues? Wisdom does not consider the means to human happiness at all, for it does not ask how anything comes into existence. Prudence, it must be granted, does do this; but what do we need it for? seeing that it studies that which is just and noble and good for man, but these are the things that a good man does by nature. Knowing about them does not make us any more capable of doing them, since the virtues are qualities of character; just as is the case with the knowledge of what is healthy and vigorous—using these words to mean not productive of health and vigor but resulting from them: we are not rendered any more capable of healthy and vigorous action by knowing the science of medicine or of physical training.
