Book 6
2
whereas if a man of good natural disposition acquires Intelligence,νοῦς here means φρόνησις as a whole: see 11.4, third note. then he excels in conduct, and the disposition which previously only resembled Virtue will now be Virtue in the true sense. Hence just as with the faculty of forming opinionsSee first note on 5.8. there are two qualities, Cleverness and Prudence, so also in the moral part of the soul there are two qualities, natural virtue and true Virtue; and true Virtue cannot exist without Prudence.
3
Hence some people maintain that all the virtues are forms of Prudence; and Socrates’ line of enquiry was right in one way though wrong in another; he was mistaken in thinking that all the virtues are forms of Prudence, but right in saying that they cannot exist without Prudence.
4
A proof of this is that everyone, even at the present day, in defining Virtue, after saying what disposition it isi.e., that it is a ἕξις προαιρετική: see the definition of Moral Virtue, 2.6.15. and specifying the things with which it is concerned, adds that it is a disposition determined by the right principle; and the right principle is the principle determined by Prudence. It appears therefore that everybody in some sense, divines that Virtue is a disposition of this nature, namely regulated by Prudence.
5
This formula however requires a slight modification. Virtue is not merely a disposition conforming to right principle, but one cooperating with right principle; and Prudence is right principlei.e., prudence is the knowledge of right principle, the presence of the ὀρθὸς λόγος in the ψυχή of the φρόνιμος (see 2.2.2, 2.6.15). in matters of conduct. Socrates then thought that the virtues are principles, for he said that they are all of them forms of knowledge. We on the other hand say that the virtues cooperate with principle.
6
These considerations therefore show that it is not possible to be good in the true sense without Prudence, nor to be prudent without Moral Virtue.
