Book 7
4
(1) To prove that pleasure is not a good at all, it is argued that (a) Every pleasure is a conscious process towards a natural state; but a process can in no case belong to the same order of things as its end; for example, the process of building cannot be a thing of the same sort as the house built. (b) The temperate man avoids pleasures. (c) The prudent man pursues freedom from pain, not pleasure. (d) Pleasures are a hindrance to prudent deliberation, and the more so the more enjoyable they are; for instance, sexual pleasure: no one could think of anything while indulging in it. (e) There is no art of pleasure; yet with every good thing there is an art which produces it. (f) Children and animals pursue pleasures.
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(2) To prove that not all pleasures are good, it is argued that (a) Some pleasures are disgraceful, and discredit the man who indulges in them. (b) Some pleasures are harmful, for certain pleasant things cause disease.
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(3) To prove that pleasure is not the Supreme Good, it is argued that it is not an end but a process.
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These then, more or less, are the current views.
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But the following considerations will show that these arguments are not conclusive to prove (1) that pleasure is not a good at all, nor (3) that it is not the Supreme Good.
