Book 1
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It appears that Parmenides conceived of the Unity as one in definition,His argument was Everything that is is one, if what is has one meaning (πάντα ἕν, εἰ τὸ ὂν ἓν σημαίνει, Aristot. Phys. 187a 1); but he probably believed, no less than Melissus, in the material unity of reality. Cf. Melissus Fr. 8 (Diels). It has been suggested, however (by the Rev. C. F. Angus), that he was simply trying to convey in figurative language a conception of absolute existence. but MelissusOf Samos; defeated the Athenian fleet in 441 B.C. as materially one. Hence the former says that it is finite,Melissus Fr. 8, ll. 32-3, 42-3. and the latter that it is infinite.Melissus Fr. 3. But Xenophanes,Of Colophon, b. 565 (?) B.C. Criticized and ridiculed most of the views of his day, especially the anthropomorphic conception of the gods. Burnet, E.G.P. 55 ff., esp. 61-62. Cf. Xenophanes Fr. 23 (Diels). the first exponent of the Unity (for Parmenides is said to have been his disciple), gave no definite teaching, nor does he seem to have grasped either of these conceptions of unity; but regarding the whole material universe he stated that the Unity is God.
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This school then, as we have said, may be disregarded for the purposes of our present inquiry; two of them, Xenophanes and Melissus, may be completely ignored, as being somewhat too crude in their views. Parmenides, however, seems to speak with rather more insight. For holding as he does that Not-being, as contrasted with Being, is nothing, he necessarily supposes that Being is one and that there is nothing else (we have discussed this point in greater detail in the Physics Aristot. Phys. 1.3 ); but being compelled to accord with phenomena, and assuming that Being is one in definition but many in respect of sensation, he posits in his turn two causes, i.e. two first principles, Hot and Cold; or in other words, Fire and Earth. Of these he ranks Hot under Being and the other under Not-being.Cf. note on Aristot. Met. 3.13.
