Book 1
5
Again, according to the assumption by which we hold that the Ideas exist, there will be Forms not only of substances but of many other things (since the concept is one not only in the case of substances, but also in the case of all other things; and there are sciences not only of substances but of other things as well; and there are a thousand other similar consequences); but according to logical necessity, and from the views generally held about them, it follows that if the Forms are participated in, then there can only be Ideas of substances. For they are not participated in qua accidents; each Form can only be participated in in so far as it is not predicated of a subject.
6
I mean, e.g., that if anything participates in absolute Doubleness it participates also in eternal, but only accidentally; because it is an accident of Doubleness to be eternal.Sensible double things are not eternal; therefore they do not, in the proper sense of participation, participate in the Idea of Doubleness qua having the accidental attribute eternal. Therefore Ideas, qua participated in, are not attributes but substances.
7
Thus the Forms must be substance. But the same names denote substance in the sensible as in the Ideal world; otherwise what meaning will there be in saying that something exists beside the particulars, i.e. the unity comprising their multiplicity?
