Book 10
4
(c) if unequal means the same as both greater and smaller at the same time, equal must still be opposed to them both: This difficulty supports the theoryHeld by the Platonists. Cf. Aristot. Met. 14.1.4, 5. that the unequal is a duality. But the result is that one thing is contrary to two; which is impossible.
5
Further, it is apparent that equal is intermediate between great and small, but it is not apparent that any contrariety is intermediate, nor can it be, by definition; for it could not be complete if it were the intermediate of something, but rather it always has something intermediate between itself and the other extreme.
5
It remains, then, that it is opposed either as negation or as privation. Now it cannot be so opposed to one of the two, for it is no more opposed to the great than to the small.
6
Therefore it is a privative negation of both. For this reason we say whether with reference to both, and not to one of the two—e.g., whether it is greater or equal, or whether it is equal or smaller; there are always three alternatives. But it is not a necessary privation; for not everything is equal which is not greater or smaller, but only things which would naturally have these attributes.
7
The equal, then, is that which is neither great nor small, but would naturally be either great or small; and it is opposed to both as a privative negation, and therefore is intermediate between them. And that which is neither good nor bad is opposed to both, but it has no name (for each of these terms has several meanings, and there is no one material which is receptive of both); that which is neither white nor black is better entitled to a name,
8
although even this has no single name, but the colors of which this negation is privatively predicated are to a certain extent limited; for it must be either grey or buff or something similar.
