Book 11
3
This difficulty will be solved if we consider the origin of the assumption. It seems probable that it arose in some cases from the doctrine of the natural philosophers, and in others from the fact that everyone does not form the same opinion about the same things, but to some a given thing seems sweet and to others the contrary.
4
For that nothing comes from what is not, but everything from what is, is a doctrine common to nearly all natural philosophers.With sect. 4, 5 cf. Aristot. Met. 4.5.6. Since, then, a thing does not become white which was before completely white and in no respect not-white, that which becomes white must come from what was not-white. Hence according to this theory there would be generation from what is not, unless the same thing were originally white and not-white.
5
However, it is not hard to solve this difficulty. We have explained in the PhysicsAristot. Physics 1.7-9. in what sense things which are generated are generated from what is not, and in what sense from what is.
5
But to attach equal importance to the opinions and impressions of opposing parties is foolish, because clearly one side or the other must be wrong.sect. 5-7=Aristot. Met. 4.5.23-27.
6
This is evident from what happens in the sphere of sensation; for the same thing never seems to some people sweet and to others to the contrary unless one of the parties has the organ of sense which distinguishes the said flavors injured or impaired. Such being the case, the one party should be taken as the measure, and the other not.
