Book 12
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Anaxagoras makes the Good a principle as causing motion; for Mind moves things, but moves them for some end, and therefore there must be some other GoodMotion presupposes a final cause, which was not what Anaxagoras meant by Mind. Cf. Aristot. Met. 1.7.5.—unless it is as we say; for on our view the art of medicine is in a sense health.Aristotle identifies the efficient cause, in a sense, with the final cause. Cf. Aristot. Met. 7.9.3. It is absurd also not to provide a contrary for the Good, i.e. for Mind.In Aristot. Met. 1.6.10 Aristotle describes Anaxagoras as a recognizing contrary principles of good and evil. Moreover, on Aristotle’s own showing, evil cannot be a principle (Aristot. Met. 9.9.3). But all those who recognize the contraries fail to make use of the contraries, unless we systematize their theories.
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And none of them explains why some things are perishable and others imperishable; for they make all existing things come from the same first principles.Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.4.11-20. Again, someCf. Aristot. Met. 12.2.2, 3. make existing things come from not-being, while others,The Eleatics. Cf. Aristot. Met. 1.5.10-13. to avoid this necessity, make all things one. Again, no one explains why there must always be generation, and what the cause of generation is.
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Moreover, those who posit two principles must admit another superior principle,i.e., an efficient cause. and so must the exponents of the Forms; for what made or makes particulars participate in the Forms? And on all other views it follows necessarily that there must be something which is contrary to Wisdom or supreme knowledge, but on ours it does not. For there is no contrary to that which is primary,
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since all contraries involve matter, and that which has matter exists potentially; and the ignorance which is contrary to Wisdom would tend towards the contrary of the object of Wisdom; but that which is primary has no contrary.
