Book 14
7
Now it is remarkable if that which is primary and eternal and supremely self-sufficient does not possess this very quality, viz. self-sufficiency and immunity, in a primary degree and as something good. Moreover, it is imperishable and self-sufficient for no other reason than because it is good. Hence it is probably true to say that the first principle is of this nature.
8
But to say that this principle is unity, or if not that, that it is an element, and an element of numbers, is impossible; for this involves a serious difficulty, to avoid which some thinkersSpeusippus and his followers; cf. sect. 3. have abandoned the theory (viz. those who agree that unity is a first principle and element, but of mathematical number). For on this view all units become identical with some good, and we get a great abundance of goods.If unity is goodness, and every unit is a kind of unity, every unit must be a kind of goodness—which is absurd.
9
Further, if the Forms are numbers, all Forms become identical with some good. Again, let us assume that there are Ideas of anything that we choose. If there are Ideas only of goods, the Ideas will not be substancesBecause they are Ideas not of substances but of qualities.; and if there are Ideas of substances also, all animals and plants, and all things that participate in the Ideas, will be goods.Because the Ideas are goods.
10
Not only do these absurdities follow, but it also follows that the contrary element, whether it is plurality or the unequal, i.e. the Great and Small, is absolute badness. Hence one thinkerSpeusippus. avoided associating the Good with unity, on the ground that since generation proceeds from contraries, the nature of plurality would then necessarily be bad.
