Book 3
12
for the first principle and cause must be apart from the things of which it is a principle, and must be able to exist when separated from them. But why should we assume that such a thing exists alongside of the individual, except in that it is predicated universally and of all the terms? And indeed if this is a sufficient reason, it is the more universal concepts that should rather be considered to be principles; and so the primary genera will be the principles.For partial solutions to the problem see Aristot. Met. 7.10, 12-13.
1
In this connection there is a difficulty which is the hardest and yet the most necessary of all to investigate, and with which our inquiry is now concerned. (7.) If nothing exists apart from individual things, and these are infinite in number, how is it possible to obtain knowledge of the numerically infinite? For we acquire our knowledge of all things only in so far as they contain something universal, some one and identical characteristic.
2
But if this is essential, and there must be something apart from individual things, it must be the genera; either the lowest or the highest; but we have just concluded that this is impossible.In Aristot. Met. 3.3.
2
Further, assuming that when something is predicated of matter there is in the fullest sense something apart from the concrete whole, if there is something, must it exist apart from all concrete wholes, or apart from some but not others, or apart from none?
3
If nothing exists apart from individual things, nothing will be intelligible; everything will be sensible, and there will be no knowledge of anything—unless it be maintained that sense-perception is knowledge. Nor again will anything be eternal or immovable, since sensible things are all perishable and in motion.
