Book 3
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And if it is concerned with substance, (3.) is there one science which deals with all substances, or more than one; and if more than one, are they all cognate, or should we call some of them kinds of Wisdom and others something different?Discussed Aristot. Met. 3.2.15-17; answered Aristot. Met. 4.2.9-10, Aristot. Met. 6.1.
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This too is a question which demands inquiry: (iv.) should we hold that only sensible substances exist, or that there are other besides? And should we hold that there is only one class of non-sensible substances, or more than one (as do those who posit the Forms and the mathematical objects as intermediate between the Forms and sensible things)?Discussed Aristot. Met. 3.2.20-30 answered Aristot. Met. 12.6-10, and also by the refutation of the Platonic Ideas and Intermediates in Books 13 and 14.
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These questions, then, as I say, must be considered; and also (v.) whether our study is concerned only with substances, or also with the essential attributes of substance;
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and further, with regard to Same and Other, and Like and Unlike and Contrariety, and Prior and Posterior, and all other such terms which dialecticians try to investigate, basing their inquiry merely upon popular opinions; we must consider whose province it is to study all of these.
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Further, we must consider all the essential attributes of these same things, and not merely what each one of them is, but also whether each one has one oppositeDiscussed Aristot. Met. 3.2.18-19; answered Aristot. Met. 4.2.8-25.; and (vi.) whether the first principles and elements of things are the genera under which they fall or the pre-existent parts into which each thing is divided; and if the genera, whether they are those which are predicated ultimately of individuals, or the primary genera—e.g., whether animal or man is the first principle and the more independent of the individual.DiscussedAristot. Met. 3.3; answered Aristot. Met. 7.10, 12-13
