Book 3
32
For that which neither when added makes a thing greater nor when subtracted makes it smaller is not an existent thing, he saysCf. Zeno, Fr. 2, and see Burnet, E.G.P. sects. 157 ff.; clearly assuming that what exists is spatial magnitude. And if it is a spatial magnitude it is corporeal, since the corporeal exists in all dimensions, whereas the other magnitudes, the plane or line, when added to a thing in one way will increase it, but when added in another will not; and the point or unit will not increase a thing in any way whatever.
33
But since Zeno’s view is unsound, and it is possible for a thing to be indivisible in such a way that it can be defended even against his argument (for such a thinge.g., a point is indivisible and has no magnitude, yet added to other points it increases their number. when added will increase a thing in number though not in size)—still how can a magnitude be composed of one or more such indivisible things? It is like saying that the line is composed of points.
34
Moreover, even if one supposes the case to be such that number is generated, as some say, from the One itself and from something else which is not one, we must none the less inquire why and how it is that the thing generated will be at one time number and at another magnitude, if the not-one was inequality and the same principle in both cases.The reference is to the Platonists. Cf. Aristot. Met. 14.1.5, 6; Aristot. Met. 14.2.13, 14. For it is not clear how magnitude can be generated either from One and this principle, or from a number and this principle.For the answer to this problem see Aristot. Met. 7.16.3, 4; Aristot. Met. 10.2; and cf. Aristot. Met. 13.8.
