Book 4
33
And if it does not apply to all, the exceptions will be admittedi.e., it will be admitted that in certain cases where an attribute is true of a subject, the negation is not true; and therefore some propositions are indisputable.; but if it does apply to all, again either (a) the negation will be true wherever the affirmation is true, and the affirmation will be true wherever the negation is true, or (d) the negation will be true wherever the assertion is true, but the assertion will not always be true where the negation is true.
34
And in the latter case there will be something which definitely is not, and this will be a certain belief; and if that it is not is certain and knowable, the opposite assertion will be still more knowable. But if what is denied can be equally truly asserted, it must be either true or false to state the predicates separately and say, e.g., that a thing is white, and again that it is not-white.
35
And if it is not-true to state them separately, our opponent does not say what he professes to say, and nothing exists; and how can that which does not exist speak or walk?If our opponent holds that you can only say A is B and not B, (1) he contradicts every statement that he makes; (2) he must say that what exists does not exist. Therefore nothing exists, and so he himself does not exist; but how can he speak or walk if he does not exist? And again all things will be one, as we said before,Aristot. Met. 4.4.27. and the same thing will be man and God and trireme and the negations of these terms.
