Book 4
6
for it is possible in the case of the same man for a thing to appear honey to the sight, but not to the taste, and for things to appear different to the sight of each of his two eyes, if their sight is unequal. For to those who assert (for the reasons previously stated Aristot. Met. 4.5.7-17. ) that appearances are true, and that all things are therefore equally false and true, because they do not appear the same to all, nor always the same to the same person, but often have contrary appearances at the same time
7
(since if one crosses the fingers touch says that an object is two, while sight says that it is only oneCf. Aristot. Problemata 958b 14, 959a 5, 965a 36.), we shall say but not to the same sense or to the same part of it in the same way and at the same time; so that with this qualification the appearance will be true. But perhaps it is for this reason that those who argue not from a sense of difficulty but for argument’s sake are compelled to say that the appearance is not true in itself, but true to the percipient;
8
and, as we have said before, are compelled also to make everything relative and dependent upon opinion and sensation, so that nothing has happened or will happen unless someone has first formed an opinion about it; otherwise clearly all things would not be relative to opinion.
8
Further, if a thing is one, it is relative to one thing or to something determinate. And if the same thing is both a half and an equal, yet the equal is not relative to the double.
9
If to the thinking subject man and the object of thought are the same, man will be not the thinking subject but the object of thought; and if each thing is to be regarded as relative to the thinking subject, the thinking subject will be relative to an infinity of specifically different things.
