Book 4
3
but in fact it is clearly always changing; for change can only be into the opposite and the intermediate. And if it is a true intermediate, in this case too there would be a kind of change into white not from not-white; but in fact this is not seen.It is not qua grey (i.e. intermediate between white and black) that grey changes to white, but qua not-white (i.e. containing a certain proportion of black). Further, the understanding either affirms or denies every object of understanding or thought (as is clear from the definitionAristot. Met. 4.7.1.)
4
whenever it is right or wrong. When, in asserting or denying, it combines the predicates in one way, it is right; when in the other, it is wrong.
4
Again, unless it is maintained merely for argument’s sake, the intermediate must exist beside all contrary terms; so that one will say what is neither true nor false. And it will exist beside what is and what is not; so that there will be a form of change beside generation and destruction.
5
Again, there will also be an intermediate in all classes in which the negation of a term implies the contrary assertion; e.g., among numbers there will be a number which is neither odd nor not-odd. But this is impossible, as is clear from the definition.What definition Aristotle had in mind we cannot tell; but it must have stated that every number is either even or odd.
5
Again, there will be an infinite progression, and existing things will be not only half as many again, but even more.
6
For again it will be possible to deny the intermediate in reference both to its assertion and to its negation, and the result will be somethingIf besides A and not-A there is an intermediate B, besides B and not-B there will be an intermediate C which is neither B nor not-B; and so on.; for its essence is something distinct.
6
Again, when a man is asked whether a thing is white and says no, he has denied nothing except that it is 〈white〉, and its not-being 〈white〉 is a negation.
