Book 7
11
The absurdity 〈of separating a thing from its essence〉 will be apparent also if one supplies a name for each essence; for then there will be another essence besides the original one, e.g. the essence of horse will have a further essence. Yet why should not some things be identified with their essence from the outset,i.e. to avoid the infinite series implied in the last sentence. if essence is substance? Indeed not only are the thing and its essence one, but their formula is the same, as is clear from what we have just stated; for it is not by accident that the essence of one, and the one, are one.
12
Moreover, if they are different, there will be an infinite series; for the essence of one and the one will both exist; so that in that case too the same principle will apply.i.e. since there is a distinct term essence of one besides one, there will be a third distinct term essence of essence of one; and so on as in the case of horse above. Clearly, then, in the case of primary and self-subsistent terms, the individual thing and its essence are one and the same.
13
It is obvious that the sophistical objections to this thesis are met in the same way as the question whether Socrates is the same as the essence of Socrates; for there is no difference either in the grounds for asking the question or in the means of meeting it successfully. We have now explained in what sense the essence is, and in what sense it is not, the same as the individual thing.
1
Of things which are generated, some are generated naturally, others artificially, and others spontaneously; but everything which is generated is generated by something and from something and becomes something. When I say becomes something I mean in any of the categories; it may come to be either a particular thing or of some quantity or quality or in some place.
1
Natural generation is the generation of things whose generation is by nature.
