Book 7
9
And the analogy in the case of the living thing which the younger SocratesA disciple of the great Socrates; one of the speakers in the PoliticusPlat. Stat. and referred to in Plat. Theaet. 147c, Plat. Soph. 218b. used to state is not a good one; for it leads one away from the truth, and makes one suppose that it is possible for a man to exist without his parts, as a circle does without the bronze. But the case is not similar; for the animal is sensible and cannot be defined without motion, and hence not unless its parts are in some definite condition;
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for it is not the hand in any condition that is a part of a man, but only when it can perform its function, and so has life in it. Without life in it it is not a part.
10
And with respect to mathematical objects, why are the formulae of the parts not parts of the formulae of the whole; e.g., why are the formulae of the semicircles not parts of the formula of the circle? for they are not sensible.
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Probably this makes no difference; because there will be matter even of some things which are not sensible. Indeed there will be matter in some sense in everything which is not essence or form considered independently, but a particular thing. Thus the semicircles will be parts not of the universal circle but of the particular circles, as we said beforeAristot. Met. 7.10.17.—for some matter is sensible, and some intelligible.
12
It is clear also that the soul is the primary substance, and the body matter; and man or animal is the combination of both taken universally. And Socrates or Coriscus has a double sense, that is if the soul too can be called Socrates (for by Socrates some mean the soul and some the concrete person); but if Socrates means simply this soul and this body, the individual is composed similarly to the universal.
