Book 7
4
Then clearly there is in some sense a formula of the universal. It makes no difference even if there is not a formula of everything that is in the substance; for the universal will be none the less the substance of something; e.g., man will be the substance of the man in whom it is present. Thus the same thing will happen againi.e., the argument in ch. 3 will apply to this case also.; e.g. animal will be the substance of that in which it is present as peculiar to it.
5
Again, it is impossible and absurd that the individual or substance, if it is composed of anything, should be composed not of substances nor of the individual, but of a quality; for then non-substance or quality will be prior to substance or the individual. Which is impossible; for neither in formula nor in time nor in generation can the affections of substance be prior to the substance, since then they would be separable.
6
Again, a substance will be present in Socrates, who is a substance; so that it will be the substance of two things. And in general it follows that if man and all terms used in this way are substance, none of the elements in the formula is the substance of anything, nor can it exist apart from the species or in anything else; I mean, e.g., that neither animal nor any other element of the formula can exist apart from the particular species.
7
If we look at the question from this standpoint it is obvious that no universal attribute is substance; and it is also clear from the fact that none of the common predicates means so-and-so, but such and-such. Otherwise amongst many other awkward consequences we have the third man. See note on Aristot. Met. 1.9.3.
8
Again, it is clear in this way too. Substance can not consist of substances actually present in it; for that which is actually two can never be actually one, whereas if it is potentially two it can be one. E.g., the double consists of two halves—that is, potentially; for the actualization separates the halves.
