Book 7
8
Now it is agreed that some sensible things are substances, and so we should begin our inquiry in connection with these.
2
It is convenient to advance to the more intelligiblesc. by nature. All learning proceeds by induction from that which is intelligible to us (i.e., the complex facts and objects of our experience, which are bound up with sensation and therefore less intelligible in themselves), to that which is intelligible in itself (i.e., the simple universal principles of scientific knowledge).; for learning is always acquired in this way, by advancing through what is less intelligible by nature to what is more so. And just as in actions it is our task to start from the good of the individual and make absolute good good for the individual,Cf. Aristot. Ethics 1129b 5. so it is our task to start from what is more intelligible to oneself and make what is by nature intelligible intelligible to oneself.
3
Now that which is intelligible and primary to individuals is often but slightly intelligible, and contains but little reality; but nevertheless, starting from that which is imperfectly intelligible but intelligible to oneself, we must try to understand the absolutely intelligible; advancing, as we have said, by means of these very things which are intelligible to us.
3
Since we distinguished at the beginningAristot. Met. 7.3.1. the number of ways in which substance is defined, and since one of these appeared to be essence, we must investigate this.
4
First, let us make certain linguistic statements about it.
4
The essence of each thing is that which it is said to be per se. To be you is not to be cultured, because you are not of your own nature cultured. Your essence, then, is that which you are said to be
4
of your own nature. But not even all of this is the essence; for the essence is not that which is said to be per se in the sense that whiteness is said to belong to a surface,Cf. Aristot. Met. 5.18.3, 4. because being a surface is not being white.
