Book 9
3
and similarly in all other cases where the generative principle is external. And in all cases where the generative principle is contained in the thing itself, one thing is potentially another when, if nothing external hinders, it will of itself become the other. E.g., the semen is not yet potentially a man; for it must further undergo a change in some other medium.This is inconsistent with Aristotle’s doctrine that the semen is the formal element in reproduction. Cf. Aristot. Met. 8.4.5, Aristot. Met. 9.6.5. But when, by its own generative principle, it has already come to have the necessary attributes, in this state it is now potentially a man, whereas in the former state it has need of another principle;
4
just as earth is not yet potentially a statue, because it must undergo a change before it becomes bronze.
4
It seems that what we are describing is not a particular thing, but a definite material; e.g., a box is not wood, but wooden material,Cf. Aristot. Met. 7.7.10-12. and wood is not earth, but earthen material; and earth also is an illustration of our point if it is similarly not some other thing, but a definite material—it is always the latter term in this series which is, in the fullest sense, potentially something else.
5
E.g., a box is not earth, nor earthen, but wooden; for it is this that is potentially a box, and this is the matter of the box—that is, wooden material in general is the matter of box in general, whereas the matter of a particular box is a particular piece of wood.
5
If there is some primary stuff, which is not further called the material of some other thing, this is primary matter. E.g., if earth is made of air, and air is not fire, but made of fire, then fire is primary matter, not being an individual thing.
