Thesauros Literature Philosophy τὰ Μετὰ τὰ Φυσικά

τὰ Μετὰ τὰ Φυσικά

τὰ Μετὰ τὰ Φυσικά Aristotle

Book 9

5 Hence even if it wishes or desires to do two things or contrary things simultaneously, it will not do them, for it has not the capability to do them under these conditions, nor has it the capability of doing things simultaneously, since it will only do the things to which the capability applies and under the appropriate conditions.
1 Since we have now dealt with the kind of potency which is related to motion, let us now discuss actuality; what it is, and what its qualities are. For as we continue our analysis it will also become clear with regard to the potential that we apply the name not only to that whose nature it is to move or be moved by something else, either without qualification or in some definite way, but also in other senses; and it is on this account that in the course of our inquiry we have discussed these as well.
2 Actuality means the presence of the thing, not in the sense which we mean by potentially. We say that a thing is present potentially as Hermes is present in the wood, or the half-line in the whole, because it can be separated from it; and as we call even a man who is not studying a scholar if he is capable of studying. That which is present in the opposite sense to this is present actually.
3 What we mean can be plainly seen in the particular cases by induction; we need not seek a definition for every term, but must comprehend the analogy: that as that which is actually building is to that which is capable of building, so is that which is awake to that which is asleep; and that which is seeing to that which has the eyes shut, but has the power of sight; and that which is differentiated out of matter to the matter; and the finished article to the raw material.
4 Let actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis, and the potential by the other.

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