Book 1
11.26
And since things which are akin and like are always pleasant to one another, and every man in the highest degree feels this in regard to himself, it must needs be that all men are more or less selfish; for it is in himself above all that such conditionsOf likeness and kinship. are to be found. Since, then, all men are selfish, it follows that all find pleasure in what is their own, such as their works and words. That is why men as a rule are fond of those who flatter and love them, of honor, and of children; for the last are their own work. It is also pleasant to supply what is wanting,11.22.
11.27
for then it becomes our work. And since it is most pleasant to command, it is also pleasant to be regarded as wiseBoth practically and speculatively or philosophically. for practical wisdom is commanding, and philosophy consists In the knowledge of many things that excite wonder. Further, since men are generally ambitious, it follows that it is also agreeable to find fault with our neighbors.
11.28
And if a man thinks he excels in anything, he likes to devote his time to it; as Euripides says: And allotting the best part of each day to that in which he happens to surpass himself, he presses eagerly towards it.Antiope (Frag. 183, T.G.F.).
11.29
Similarly, since amusement, every kind of relaxation, and laughter are pleasant, ridiculous things—men, words, or deeds—must also be pleasant. The ridiculous has been discussed separately in the Poetics.Only the definition appears in the existing text; The ridiculous is an error, painless and non-destructive ugliness (Aristot. Poet. 5). Let this suffice for things that are pleasant; those that are painful will be obvious from the contraries of these.
